We focus on the extent of the information driven trading sourcing from the behavior of the market makers on the emerging market. We developed a methodology based on the Easley et al. (1996) model to be able to estimate the extent of informed trading originating from the behavior of Czech market makers on the Prague Stock Exchange. According to the high percentage of block trades in the years 2003-05 the market makers focusing on large customers may have significant source of private information on the PSE. Founding significant differences in behavior of market makers we conclude that they remarkably affect the extent of information driven trading. Under current regulation they are able to defend their private information and not to reveal it completely for a surprisingly long time period. Our study could significantly contribute to the detection mechanisms of regulatory authorities on the emerging markets in identifing the suspicious behavior of particular market participants.
INTRODUCTION
A significant number of studies deal with the issue of insider or informed trading on developed and also emerging markets. Starting with the seminal work of Kyle (1985) various models were developed on insider trading or informed trading and a lot of empirical studies attempted to estimate the severity of this problem. Easley et al. (1996) developed a model based on the imbalance of buys and sells order flow commonly used in the literature to estimate the extent or probability of insider or information driven trading (PIN). Nevertheless, Vega (2006) is pointing out that PIN is not exclusively an insider trading measure as it also captures informed trading by investors who are particularly skillful in analyzing public news.
Therefore, the information driven trading is much broader concept including not only the mostly illegal insider trading but also many other types of trading behavior and according to Vega (2006) it also includes the public news surprises.
1 Overall, PIN is measuring the additional cost of investing in a given market as high PIN suggests frequent new information with impact on the price and high proportion of investors trading based on such information.
Hence, the extent of information driven trading considerably affects the credibility in a given financial market as it also increase the cost of acquiring the information about good timing of the trade. As mentioned above insider trading is illegal behavior in many countries.
Nevertheless, the margin between insider and informed trading is not such obvious as it may look like. Insider trading can be described as the situation where the investor is trading on some private information that is available only to restricted number of people. There is quite a large consensus in the society that for example the management of the company should not trade based on the information about quarterly profits before the disclosure. On the other hand 1 Contrary to the hypothesis of the semi-strong efficiency that the public information is fully incorporated into price findings of Vega (2006) suggest that part of the abnormal order flow may be initiated by the public news that are not easily interpreted. In other words unexpected public news may affect the PIN and the traders who are promptly able to react on them are according to Easley et al. (1996) model also informed.
there are many cases where the participants of the capital market are trading based on the private information, however, there is no consensus whether such behavior is right. 2 We focus on the extent of the information driven trading sourcing from the behavior of the market makers on the emerging market. More specifically, we are analyzing the behavior of the Czech market makers on the most active market in the Czech Republic -SPAD trading system at the Prague Stock Exchange. The behavior of some of the market makers on the PSE could be described as controversial. The distinctive characteristic of the Czech capital market is the dominant role of several market makers who act also as brokers. Hanousek and Podpiera (2004) obtained the same PIN in their analysis of shares of Ceska sporitelna and
Erste bank, which is surprising, as these two shares have very little in common except the PSE market makers. Thus one could raise a question to what extent may the market makers on PSE affect the probability of informed trading. Previous studies 3 claim that the large informed investors are often trying to hide their trades by breaking up large trades into smaller ones.
These studies suggest that the market structure influences how informed investors behave in order to hide their private information. In the case of the trading behavior of market makers on the Czech capital market, this corresponds to the fact that the large investors often have contracts with the market makers to optimize the processing of the large orders. The lower competition between market makers may lead to the capability of large informed traders or market makers to maintain the private information or to hide their trades for a remarkable long time periods. Further, the market makers could also use dual trading, i.e. trading on their own account, either ahead of or following the execution of their customers' orders. Therefore the market makers may be a significant source of information driven trading on small emerging markets.
To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first to analyze the extent of information driven trading of market makers. We extend the Easley et al. (1996) model in order to estimate the extent of information driven trading sourcing from the particular trading behavior of market makers on the PSE. This study is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the motivation and background of the present study; section 3 describes the methodology; details about the data are outlined in section 4; the empirical results are discussed in section 5; and section 6 concludes the study.
BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
The literature focusing on the information driven trading and behavior of dealers or market makers deals with the informational advantage of the market makers obtaining the order flow from their customers from several perspectives. The first stream of literature is focusing on the problematic of dual trading. A number of papers, theoretical and empirical, deals with the problem of whether dual traders are informed or not. Most of the theoretical studies start with the assumption that dual traders are informed traders and then investigate the effect of their trading strategies (see, for example Grossman (1989) , Roell (1990) , Fishman and Longstaff (1992) , Chakravarty (1994) , Sarkar (1995) ). The results of these studies may suggest that dual traders on less regulated markets are informed traders.
Some empirical papers have focused on analyzing the validity of this assumption. Fishman and Longstaff (1992) have developed a model of dual trading assuming that the broker has imperfect information about his customers (whether they are informed or uninformed). Using the data for actively traded soybean futures contracts at the Chicago Board of Trade they show that personal trading profits of dual trading brokers are significantly higher than those of other floor traders and that these profits are higher on days they are dual trading, suggesting that dual traders are informed. Chakravarty and Li (2003a) estimate a simultaneous equation model with binary endogenous variable (the decision whether to trade on broker's own account) and a trading profit variable. The dual trading should be treated as endogenous. The main difference between their approach and the study of Fishman and Longstaff (1992) is that they are isolating the abnormal trading profit associated with the dual trading from the overall trading profit. Chakravarty and Li (2003a) orders and also conclude that the dual trader is an uninformed trader trading primarily for liquidity provision and inventory rebalancing. However, they mention that the difference between their study and the study of Fishman and Longstaff (1992) may not come just from the different taken approach but also due to differences in the data and time periods. The study of Fishman and Longstaff (1992) is namely based on the data over a period just before the FBI launched a Federal investigation into fraudulent trading practices on the Chicago future exchanges.
Moreover, there are several papers focusing rather on the overall information advantage of market makers, dealers or brokers 4 than on a particular behavior like dual trading practice. Madhavan and Panchapagesan (2000) develop and test model based on the opening procedures on NYSE with strategic market maker setting the opening price after observing the order flow. They point out that the market maker significantly facilitates price discovery -opening price set by the specialist is more efficient than the price that would prevail in a pure auction with only public orders. Hasbrouck and Sofianos (1993) focus on the trading behavior of NYSE specialists. The long-term profits of the specialists on NYSE are not significantly different from zero. However, by analyzing the inventory adjustment, price 4 sourcing for example from obtaining the order flow determination and trading profits they conclude that the specialists are able to generate shorttime trade profits, mostly as a consequence of the bid-ask spread. Further, although the specialists are capable of adjusting rapidly their positions they usually opt for adjustment lags of days or weeks. Therefore, their results may suggest that the requirements and monitoring on NYSE play an important role in the behavior of specialists as despite the informational advantage they do not misuse it to generate profits. Kurov and Lasser (2004) are addressing similar issue by assuming that market microstructure and regulation are key features affecting the response on private information sourcing from the order flow. Through the analysis of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME) locals trades on the E-mini markets they conclude that the exchange locals are informed traders with informational advantage sourcing primarily from the obtained order flow.
Nevertheless, the dealers or market makers may gain advantage over the other participants of the market not only from the order flow but also from the other privileges.
Focusing on the pure limit order market Wang and Chae (2003) found strong positive correlation between dealers' weekly trades and weekly returns, mainly for large dealers. They results imply that the large dealers on the Taiwan Stock Exchange are acting as informed traders rather than liquidity suppliers. However, only brokers on the market are able to view the order flow of their customers. Therefore, the informational advantage of the dealers on the market originates probably from the privileged position consisting of direct access to the electronic exchange without any trading fees or trading delays.
So far, the literature suggests that the market makers or dealers may anticipate the private information from the order flow. Nevertheless, the studies analyzing the traders' behavior suggests that the profit maximizing informed trader will protect his information using stealth trading practice. Barclay and Warner (1993) were the first to propose the stealth trading hypothesis that the informed traders are splitting their orders and using medium-sized trades to avoid detection. They argue that due to the lack of anonymity on the market for the large orders, also known as upstairs market, the informed traders may achieve more favorable price by breaking up their large orders into the medium sized trades and therefore they expect that the most of the stock's cumulative price change should take place on the medium-size trades. Barclay and Warner (1993) find empirical evidence for their hypothesis using a sample of NYSE stocks from 1981 to 1984.
Several studies provide further empirical evidence for stealth trading hypothesis (Anand and Chakravarty 2007; Anand et.al. 2005; Chakravarty 2001 ). Chakravarty (2001) analyzing the sample of NYSE stocks data confirms the results of Barclay and Warner (1993) and further points out that the primary source of the stealth trading are the institutional investors. Anand and Chakravarty (2007) are testing the stealth trading hypothesis in the options market. They showed that the informed traders use medium size trades in the high leverage and high volume options but they prefer small size trades in higher leverage but lower volume options. Anand et al. (2005) results are supporting the notion that informed traders dynamically update their behavior according to market structure and behavior of other participants of the capital market. In their empirical analysis of audit trail data from NYSE they find that the informed (institutional) traders use market orders more often in the first half of the trading day. However, they also frequently use limit orders acting as liquidity suppliers in the second half of a day. Chakravarty et al. (2005) provide further evidence that the informed traders dynamically react on the conditions and behavior of the market on the example of Australian Stock Exchange. They conclude that, similarly to the US market, the informed traders tend to break up their orders into medium-size and surprisingly also smallsize trades. Further, their results suggest that the informed traders tend to use smaller size trades when selling stocks that incur price decreases. Nevertheless, contrary to previous research they did not find any evidence that the institutional investors are better informed. Charoenwong and Jenwittayaroje (2007) are pointing out that the previous studies on stealth trading focused mainly on markets with market makers and due to the ability of market makers to identify the large informed orders, the medium-sized orders are the most informed.
They examine the stealth trading on a pure limit order market (Stock Exchange of Thailand) and conclude that the informed traders are using larger-sized trades compared to the dealership markets.
The above mentioned studies suggest that the informed traders' behavior differs according to market microstructure and also that the market makers are important participants of the market who are able to recognize the informed traders. Several studies are dealing with the ability of the market makers to identify the informed traders and the effect on the probability of information driven trading. Garfinkel and Nimalendran (2003) suggest, comparing the trades on NYSE and NASDAQ, that the spread is larger on the insider trading days leading to a conclusion that NYSE as less anonymous market has lower extent of informed trading. Heidl and Huang (2002) support their results by analyzing the change in the extent of the information driven trading due to the change of the listing of the stock. They conclude that the change in listing from dealership to auction market (NASDAQ to NYSE or AMEX) leads to a significant decrease in the extent of the information driven trading.
Therefore, either the specialist on the NYSE has higher ability to identify informed traders or the informed investors prefer to trade on market with higher degree of anonymity. Grammig et al. (2001) are also analyzing the difference in the extent of information driven trading between dealership and auction markets. Using the data from the non-anonymous floor trading on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange and anonymous electronic trading system IBIS (replaced by XETRA in 1997) they suggest that the informed traders prefer to execute their orders in the anonymous environment. They conclude that a higher degree of anonymity is associated with a higher probability of information driven trading which is significantly lower on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange. Huang (2002) and Barclay et al. (2003) focus on ECN networks on NASDAQ. They show that the anonymous ECN networks attract more informed traders mainly during the high volume trading periods and that the ECN trades' price impact is significantly higher than the impact of the trades of the NASDAQ market makers. Lee and Yi (2001) investigate the relation of the information driven trading and the size of the trades on the options and stock markets. They argue that mainly due to the higher anonymity of the large informed traders the extent of information driven trading is higher on the NYSE compared to Chicago Board Options Exchange. However, their results suggest that the opposite is true for the small trades suggesting that extent of the information driven trading decreases with the trade size in the option market.
Analyzing a theoretical model of anonymous trading floor with the non-anonymous upstairs market for block transactions Seppi (1990) is pointing out that only uninformed traders will trade on the upstairs market. Smith et al. (2000) support empirically his model by analyzing the upstairs market for the large orders on the Toronto Stock Exchange. The structure of Toronto Stock Exchange does not allow an investor to select the upstairs or downstairs market for execution. All orders go first to the market maker on the upstairs market who then decides whether to react on them or to send the order downstairs.
Nevertheless, the key feature of the TSE is the rule that impose the market maker to execute the orders on terms at least as favorable as those available on the downstairs market at the time the order is received. Therefore the market makers submit most of the orders immediately downstairs. Smith et al (2000) conclude that due to the screening of the market makers they do not trade with the informed traders and send their orders directly downstairs, resulting in more information content of trades in the downstairs market. Therefore, they are pointing out that the non-anonymous upstairs market significantly improves the liquidity for the large liquidity orders lowering also the cost to process such large orders. However, the regulation of the upstairs market is quite important on the Toronto Stock Exchange. The feature of granting the price at least as good as on the downstairs market may increase the transparency of large orders.
In our study we are focusing on the differences in the information content of the trades of particular market makers on the PSE. Due to the specifics of small emerging market every large order affects the price on the market significantly. The market makers may become informed after observing their customers' orders and thus be able to take advantage of this information by trading on their own account either ahead of or following the execution of their customers' orders. Further, the lack of regulation commonly present on the developed markets 5 may increase the threat of dual trading practice. Therefore, the market makers or brokers may face the temptation to use dual trading practice which is not illegal on the Czech capital market.
Nevertheless, large investors are key customers for some of the market makers. Such trading practices as dual trading could affect the credibility of these customers in a given market maker. Therefore, the more plausible scenario of the situation on the Czech capital market is following. Significant amount of traded volume is processed through the block trades on the PSE. Because of predatory trading the institutional traders and other large investors do not want to publicly disclose their trading needs and therefore prefer higher degree of anonymity on the market. (Economides and Schwartz 1995; Brunnermeier and Pederssen 2005) . According to the above-mentioned literature, informed traders are often trying to hide their information and react dynamically on the behavior of other market participants and overall environment. The market microstructure in the Czech Republic allows such investors to negotiate the price for the large block trades with the market makers.
In other words the market makers and large investors are often somehow sharing the private 5 Like, for example,Chinese wall between brokerage and market making activities or dealership activities.
information. 6 Such practice may lead to the situation where several of the market makers are informed. Further, only the market maker and the investor are aware about the volume and price of the trade till the execution and disclosure of the block trade. Therefore, the informed market maker may start behaving strategically to preserve the information about the large order in order to maximize his profit and to respond to the threat of predatory trading. Even on the developed market like NYSE the specialists usually prefer longer adjustment lags of their inventories. Due to the lower competition of the market makers on the Czech market, some of them are able to stay aggressively on the one side of the market for a pretty long time periods. In other words, the dominant market makers are able to use the market to achieve the desired inventory positions rather than to supply liquidity to the market.
The results of Podpiera (2002, 2004) are supporting our hypothesis.
Many observers agree that informed and insider trading is a widespread practice in the emerging financial markets. Hanousek and Podpiera (2002) estimated the extent of informed trading on the Czech capital market in the blue chips segment of the PSE using for their analysis Easley et al. (1996) We developed a methodology based on the Easley et al (1996) model to be able to estimate the extent of informed trading originating from the behavior of market makers on PSE. Using the data from the SPAD trading system on the PSE we are testing the hypothesis that over several time periods some of the market makers were informed. In other words we are testing the hypothesis that due to some private information about large block order they behaved significantly different than the other market makers, using just the sum of the buys and sells for a given market during our sample period. Therefore, our methodology could significantly contribute to the detection mechanisms of regulatory authorities on emerging markets in order identify the suspicious behavior of particular market participants.
METHODOLOGY
The model is based on the framework developed by Easley et al. (1996) . There exist three types of agents on the market -uninformed (noisy) traders, informed traders and market makers. Trading is divided into n separate trading days. Before each day an information event may occur. An information event is defined as the occurrence of a signal s about the value of the asset. The probability that a signal occurs is α, and if a signal occurs, it takes on two possible values: low with probability δ and high with probability 1-δ. 8 If a signal occurs, some fraction of the traders receives the signal. If no signal occurs, all traders stay uninformed. All participants are familiar with the structure of the market and see all the trades with specification whether given trade was buy or sell and which market maker was on the one side of the trade. Therefore, the uninformed traders and market makers are learning during the day and updating their beliefs about occurrence and sign of the signal. After each 7 In 2000, Ceska sporitelna was privatized to the Austrian banking house Erste Bank. Erste Bank, already listed in Vienna, started dual listing on PSE in October 2002. 8 In the case of bad signal the value of the asset is V , for good signal V and for no signal unchanged.
trading day the information is revealed to all participants of the market. The arrival rates of traders follow Poisson processes with arrival rate ε for uninformed traders and μ for informed traders. 9 Liquidity traders buy or sell shares of the asset for reasons that are exogenous to the model. However, informed traders trade only when they see some signal; if they receive good news (the current asset price is below the liquidation value of the asset) they buy the stock, if they receive bad news they sell the stock. The probability that a bad news day occurs is αδ and the arrival rates of buyers and sellers are ε and ε+μ respectively. The good news day occurs with probability α(1 -δ) and the arrival rates of buyers and sellers are ε+μ and ε. The no event day occurs with probability 1 -α and the arrival rate of both buyers and sellers is ε.
Therefore the probability of observing a given number of buys and sells can be expressed as where S is number of sells, B number of buys. The first part of the expression (2.1) denotes no event day, the second part bad event day and the third part good event day. According to the assumptions of the model the days are independent and therefore the probability of observing series of days with a given sum of buys and sells for each day is a product of the probability for individual days.
The parameter θ = (α, δ, ε, μ) is then estimated using the maximum likelihood method. The probability of the information driven trading is the chance that a market maker will trade with the informed trader and therefore can be computed as a ratio of arrival rate of informed traders and arrival rate of all traders:
Contrary to the original model, in our model there are two types of market makers. So far we did not consider the informed market makers or effect of the large orders on the market. Let us assume that there is other information affecting the price of an asset -the information about a large order that is independent to above mentioned the private signal of the informed investors and that is lasting for several trading days. Only one informed market maker has a private information about this large order coming on the market from one of his Further, to minimize the impact on the price, the large orders are usually processed in such way that the market maker and the large investor decides to settle on the block trade, i.e., the market maker will accumulate the shares and then use the block trade with his client.
Therefore the market maker have incentives to act strategically in the way that he is trying to choose the optimal timing of several trades to process the whole big order at the best possible price. However, he is not trying to manipulate the price or use any illegal market abuse practice. We are assuming that there is only one informed market maker in a given time period. If more than one market maker receive the large order and if the market makers do not act in consonance with each other, the order will be revealed to the whole market and the new value of the asset will be revealed immediately by competitive behavior of two or more informed market makers. If the market maker is informed, we assume that he does not set quotes in the way which will reveal his information about the order immediately to everybody. Therefore, for example, in the case of a large buy order the informed market maker will just try to be in the best quote 11 -he would post his quotes for buys more actively and therefore will end up with the best quote with higher probability than the uninformed market maker. Although the other market makers may anticipate that the market maker is informed, they will still be unaware about the exact information about the large order.
Therefore, even though they will know that some new information exists, the price will not reach the new value of the asset 12 immediately as the other market makers will not post better quotes than the informed market maker facing the risk that they are above or under the new price. On the other hand, in the case of a large sell order the informed market makers will post their quotes such that they would avoid ending up with the best quote on the buy side.
Another point of view is that the market makers without outside information about the large order will try to avoid risky unbalanced positions and therefore will post quotes such that they would have somehow balanced inventories. On the other hand, the informed market makers contingent on their information may venture on more risky positions from a point of view of uninformed market makers and therefore may afford to quote actively only buys or sells. The uninformed market makers generate profit from the trading fees and spread, however, the informed market maker is generating profit also from proprietary trading. Therefore they will likely end up with unbalanced number of buys and sells after a trading day or series of trading days.
11 Pair of the best buy and best sell quote from all market maker's quotes 12 New value of the asset consist also of the information about the large order
To estimate the extent of the information driven trading due to the large orders or in other words informed market makers we will at first run the estimations for the whole sum of buys and sells. Further, to estimate the probability of informed trading originating from the large orders or some other private information of the market makers we are proposing the procedure to estimate PIN with and without the trades of informed market makers. Therefore, we will step by step exclude each market maker's trades from the sum of buys and sell and estimate the model. Having all the parameters θ i = (α i , δ i , ε i , μ i ) estimated for each market maker we will then test whether the PIN using estimated parameters θ = (α, δ, ε, μ) and probability of information driven trading without considering the trades of given market maker are significantly different. Both estimators of PIN have asymptotically normal distribution and the estimators are positively correlated. Therefore using the test of the equality of the mean of two normal distributions and neglecting the correlation will imply even more significant difference then the p-value is suggesting. Having identified the informed market makers we can estimate the effect of the large orders on the probability of informed driven trading:
where θ = (α, δ, ε, μ) are estimated parameters θ = (α, δ, ε, μ) from the classic Easley et al. (1996) model using sum of all buys and sells for each day and θ i = (α i , δ i , ε i , μ i ) are the estimated parameters using sum of all buys and sells for each day without the trades of given identified informed market maker. The extent of information driven trading sourcing from the behavior of informed market maker is therefore the difference between the probability of informed trading with and without the trades of informed market maker.
DATA
For our analysis, we are using the intra-day trading data from PSE from the SPAD trading system from 1.1.2003 till 30.9.2006, publicly available online.
13 Each trade record in our databases consists of the security identification, date, time, type of the trade, price, and for the standard SPAD trades also the identification of the market maker who was trading it. We are also able to identify the cross trades -the trades conducted between the inventory of the market maker and the market maker's client. The key feature of our dataset is that we are able identify not only whether the given trade was buyer or seller initiated but also which market maker was on the one side of the trade.
The sample period consists of 945 trading days and we focus on 10 companies traded during the period. However, only 6 of them were traded during the whole period -two banks Our model assumes significant role of block trades as a source of the information of some market makers and the data seem to comply with this assumption. As you can see in the The market makers differ in their specialization on different type of customers -retail vs. large. However, none of the eleven market makers on SPAD had significantly higher market share in any of analyzed stocks. In our sample each traded stock has at least 6 market makers with comparable market share. As you can see in the Table 2 the maximum market share reached 25,56 percent for MM 7.
The average number of trades during a day differs significantly among the stocks during the sample period. However, the average for each stock was moderately increasing and did not changed significantly for most of the analyzed time periods. Each row consists of percentage and number of trades of given market maker during the sample period. APDaverage number of trades per day. Days -number of trading days for a given stock in the sample. Trades -total number of trades.
Newly introduced stocks attracted the attention of investors quite quickly and the activity of these new blue chips on the PSE was almost immediately comparable to the already 
RESULTS
First of all, we have to point out that there are significant differences in the intra day trading periods on the Czech capital market. Therefore we decided to divide each day into two main parts -morning session starting 9:30 a.m. to 12:00 a.m. and the afternoon session starting 14:00 p.m. to 16:00 p.m. Only minority of trades take place between 12:00 a.m. and 14:00 p.m. and even these are mainly done by automation. Therefore we are not considering them in our analysis. The new information is coming to the Czech capital market in the morning before the morning session and then in the afternoon when the news from US capital market are known. Nevertheless, the trading behavior of investors as well as market makers follow specific and significantly different pattern during the morning and afternoon session, therefore we decided to estimate the extent of information driven trading for both session separately.
Given the long time span of our dataset and consistently with the assumption of stationarity of the Poisson processes in the model we decided first to run the rolling window of 90 trading days through our sample period and for each window estimate the extent of the information driven trading. We believe that the 90 trading days' window is optimal balance between the assumption of stationarity and the reasonable length according to the precision of estimates. Although during some rolling windows the assumption of stationarity was violated, this procedure gave us a first insight on the behavior of market makers during our sample period. The resulting graphs are presented in the appendix.
14 Based on the above results we decided to focus on particular stocks for which our initial estimations of 90-days rolling windows suggested significantly different behavior of particular market makers. In the Table 4 you can find the results of tests on the time periods that we decided to focus on after the first insight based on the rolling window estimations.
14 See Figures 1a, 1b, 1c in the Appendix Overall, our results suggest that during our sample period there were several market makers that behaved significantly different than the rest of the market makers on the PSE. We should point out that the difference does not implicate that the market maker is insider as he may be just processing large foreign order or use a dual trading practice which is not illegal in Czech
Republic. Nevertheless, rejecting the null hypothesis of equality of the estimates means that the market maker has a considerable imbalance between his mandatory sells and buys and his behavior differs from the behavior of other market makers during the particular time period. The PIN MM is the estimate of information driven trading using the sum of buys and sells except the buys and sells of given market maker. The standard deviations are in parentheses below each estimation. Our results are suggesting that even though the participants of the market are aware of the different behavior of several market makers, they are not able to compete with them due to the superior information sourcing for example from the information about large order. As mentioned above, our test is based on the comparison of estimates using the whole sum of buys and sells and of estimates using just the sum of buys and sells without particular market maker. Therefore, even though the market participants are able to see the sum of buys and sells they are not able to completely reveal the information about the large foreign order or other private information the informed market maker may have throughout the particular time period.
We further focused on the effect of the trading lot change on the trading behavior. As we already mentioned changing the lot size may affect the extent of the information driven trading as the informed traders are more likely trading larger volumes. Lower lot volume may attract more uninformed investors. The estimation and test results are summarized in Table 5 below. As we can see, most of the changes of the lot size significantly affected the extent of the information driven trading as it attracted the trading volume of uninformed investors.
Very interesting result is the case of the changing the lot size for Unipetrol as we can see that the change attracted many new investors, however, because the extent of information driven trading changed significantly only in the morning session, one can assume that they were only from the Europe or Czech Republic. While comparing our results to the previous studies in terms of estimated extent of information driven trading (PIN) it should be highlighted that contrary to the other studies our trade data consist of precise information whether the trade is mandatory buy or mandatory sell 15 . Boehmer et al. (2007) are pointing out that using only the estimation whether the trade is buyer or seller-initiated leads to downward biased PIN estimates and that the magnitude of the bias is related to the security's trading intensity. This may partly explain the difference in our results comparing to the previous results of Hanousek and Podpiera (2004) as they were using the data for the whole day and were estimating whether the trade was buyer or sellerinitiated using Lee and Ready (1991) methodology. Hanousek and Podpiera (2004) Table 6 . The considerable increase of the trading volume of probably foreign uninformed investors results in statistical significant decrease in the afternoon trading for the CME after the submission into the MCSI index of Morgan Stanley. Extent of information driven trading within the 90-days of trading days before and after the event. The standard deviations are in parentheses below each estimation.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we are analyzing the behavior of market makers and the ability to maintain private information about large orders. We found significant differences in behavior among market makers on the Prague Stock Exchange supporting the previous perception that they have dominant role and don't only have enough power to affect the price for a short time interval but if we take into the account large orders the results are suggesting that they may affect the price also over surprisingly long time period. Although the other participants of the market may be aware that some of the market makers may possess private information about the value of the asset they are not able to reveal the whole information. Further, our analysis is suggesting that the important changes like decreasing the volume of trading lot may affect the extent of information driven trading. Therefore, our methodology could significantly contribute to the detection mechanisms of regulatory authorities on emerging markets in identifying the suspicious behavior of particular market participants.
Despite the fact that our data suggest that the market makers have really strong position on the PSE the optimal policy from the regulatory point of view is not so straightforward. Market maker should be somehow protected to be able to maintain the private information about large block trades and be able to face the threat of the predatory trading and increased volatility during such trades. Nevertheless, the current practice of the market makers leads to the threat for the minority investors not to buy or sell their stocks at the price reflecting fully all the relevant information. Further, under the current regulation the market makers are able to defend and not to completely reveal their private information for a surprisingly long time period leading to the perception that the further regulation already common on the developed markets may be beneficial to increase the credibility of investors in the market. 
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